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FREEDOM OF SPEECH. By Eric Barendt.I Oxford: Clar-
endon Press. 1987. Pp. 366. Paper, $19.95. 
Steven D. Smith 2 
The principal achievement of Professor Eric Barendt's Free-
dom of Speech is one which the author did not intend. Asserting 
"[t]he closeness of the relationship between legal and philosophical 
reasoning," Professor Barendt argues that "the more difficult free 
speech questions can only be answered after reflection on the rea-
sons of principle why free speech is valued so highly." He attempts 
to connect these contentions to an argument for constitutionalism-
and for a particular approach to constitutional interpretation. In 
treating a wide array of specific free speech problems, however, 
Barendt's philosophical analysis rarely generates convincing solu-
tions. Hence, the book's ultimate effect-albeit an unintended 
one-is to undermine the case for philosophical analysis as a 
method of constitutional interpretation. 
The book's flaws are doubly significant because its philosophi-
cal approach typifies an influential mode of constitutional interpre-
tation that has been elaborated in its most self-conscious form, 
perhaps, by Professor Ronald Dworkin. Barendt, of course, is not 
Hercules. But he is a thoughtful scholar who would compare very 
favorably with the typical judge in his philosophical aptitude and 
international knowledge of free speech law. Hence, the gaps and 
shortcomings of Barendt's analysis can serve as useful illustrations 
of the pitfalls in a common approach to constitutional inter-
pretation. 
I 
Barendt discusses not only case law under the United States 
Constitution's speech and press clauses but also English and West 
German (and occasionally New Zealand, French, Canadian, Aus-
tralian, Irish, and South African) law, as well as decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights. Barendt's preface properly cau-
tions, however, that the book is not intended to be a comparative 
law treatise, but rather an analysis of "legal questions in the context 
of fundamental free speech principles." Accordingly, in his first 
chapter, Barendt presents the most common philosophical ratio-
I. Fellow and Tutor in Law, St. Catherine's College, Oxford. 
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado. I thank Robert Nagel for com-
menting upon a draft of this review. 
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nales for free expression.J He also describes some of the major ob-
jections to such rationales. 
The remainder of the book discusses nearly all of the major 
free speech issues with which courts have had to grapple, ranging 
from traditional controversies about seditious speech, libel, and ob-
scenity to more recent issues raised by the regulation of campaign 
financing and cable television. Barendt describes and often evalu-
ates the judicial treatment of these issues, emphasizing American 
and then English case law. In most instances, he concludes that 
speech receives greater legal protection in the United States than in 
England-a fact which Barendt attributes to the lack of constitu-
tional protection for speech in England. 
Along the way, the book provides readers with assorted inci-
dental benefits. For instance, the first chapter might serve as a brief 
introduction to free speech theory. The book also reveals alter-
native approaches or solutions to speech issues which American ju-
rists and lawyers might profitably consider. It is instructive to 
learn, for example, that other nations normally regarded as democ-
racies may take very different positions than ours on matters such 
as group libel, film censorship, and regulation of extremist political 
groups such as Nazis-without sliding down that ever-menacing 
(and, for rhetorical purposes, ever-useful) slippery slope to 
authoritarianism. 4 
These benefits, however, reflect secondary concerns of the 
book, and thus do not provide appropriate bases for evaluating it. 
Barendt's discussion of philosophical rationales for free speech is by 
his own admission a "short and inevitably oversimplified account." 
And although American lawyers might gain valuable ideas from 
European and English law, Barendt's intention seems just the oppo-
site: accusing English courts of "myopia" in matters of expression, 
he hopes that English lawyers will see the superior virtues of Ameri-
can law and, hence, the need for constitutional protection of speech. 
This perspective is not calculated to make American lawyers sensi-
3. These include Mill's argument that freedom of expression is a prerequisite for the 
discovery of truth, Meiklejohn's argument that free speech is essential to democratic govern-
ment, and the argument (associated in this country with scholars such as Martin Redish and 
C. Edwin Baker) that free expression is necessary for self-realization or self-fulfillment. 
4. Barendt himself sometimes makes use of "slippery slope" arguments. But his dis-
cussion does not confirm, and occasionally undermines, the assumption that governments 
have some natural proclivity towards suppression which can be controlled only by rigid legal 
restraints. For instance, he notes that in Britain, the still extant offense of seditious libel is 
literally inclusive enough to permit the prosecution of ''much political argument and ora-
tory," and could theoretically "have the effect of stilling any serious criticism of govern-
ment." In reality, however, "prosecutions for sedition have become virtually unknown." 
1988] BOOK REVIEW 499 
tive to the limitations of their own modes of analysis, or to attrac-
tive alternatives from foreign jurisdictions. 
Although its various virtues and uses should be noted, 
Barendt's book must in the end be evaluated in relation to its cen-
tral theses. Those theses are that free speech problems should be 
resolved in the light of philosophical reasoning, and that the proper 
function of philosophy is to guide the interpretation of a constitu-
tional free speech clause. 
II 
Perhaps the most critical step in Barendt's analysis occurs so 
quickly that it might easily pass unnoticed: philosophical principles 
are presented as a guide to interpretation of the free speech clause. 
That clause, after all, must mean something. But the "literal ap-
proach to textual interpretation is of little assistance," and "[f]or 
rather obvious reasons [the] technique [of relying upon the framers' 
intent] cannot really be sustained." So what is left? Plainly, the 
argument runs, we must tum to philosophical principles in order to 
figure out what the free speech clause means. Philosophy qualifies 
to be our guide, in this instance, by default.s 
Though familiar enough, such reasoning is, upon closer inspec-
tion, odd. The oddity may be made more conspicuous by contrast-
ing Barendt's argument for employing philosophical principles with 
related arguments that might be made by what have historically 
been the most influential conceptions of law: naturalism and posi-
tivism. A naturalist approach to law would argue that philosophi-
cal principles for protecting speech should govern if they are valid 
or correct. Thus, a natural lawyer presumably would defend the 
use of such principles by trying to demonstrate that they are correct 
on their merits, and thus able to withstand objections. Conversely, a 
positivist approach to law would argue that such principles should 
govern if they have been adopted by the relevant political authority 
or sovereign-meaning, in a constitutional democracy, the people 
or their representatives. 
Barendt pursues neither of these alternatives. He notes that 
the free speech principles are subject to serious objections, and he 
5. Barendt qualifies this conclusion by observing that "[j]udicial consideration of the 
[purely philosophical arguments] must be tempered by the constraints imposed by the text, 
and must funher be substantially molded by the concepts adopted by the framers of the 
constitution as revealed in its general structure." This concession does not square comforta-
bly with the earlier assertion that "[e]ven when it is possible to infer a particular intent, it 
should not necessarily be decisive for litigation arising some decades or centuries after the 
framing of the constitution." In fact Barendt's analysis of United States law rarely if ever 
finds guidance in the constitutional text or the historical framers' intent. 
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does not pretend to have refuted those objections; such a refutation, 
if it could be made at all, would require vastly more space and anal-
ysis than Barendt devotes to the problem. Nor does Barendt make 
any attempt to demonstrate that those who wrote, proposed, and 
ratified the first amendment consciously intended to embrace such 
principles. Thus, his discussion leaves free speech principles with-
out a secure footing either in philosophy or in popular sovereignty. 
Nonetheless, such principles are said to be contained in the supreme 
law of the land because in some mysterious sense they tell us what 
the first amendment means. Rather than earning its way, philoso-
phy gets piggy-backed into law through a theory of "inter-
pretation. "6 
This argument for philosophical interpretation is, to be sure, 
devilishly difficult to refute. Trying to deflate the argument is a lot 
like trying to pop a soggy balloon by squeezing it; you can crush it 
wherever you like, but the balloon just bubbles forth somewhere 
else. Why, one may ask, should we interpret the first amendment to 
contain or express philosophical principles that the text does not, 
and the framers apparently did not, expressly or consciously adopt? 
Because, Barendt suggests, such principles give needed meaning to 
the amendment; they make it, to borrow a phrase from Dworkin (or 
is it from an ad promoting military enlistment?), "the best it can 
be." Well, then, why should we choose to be ruled by such princi-
ples when they are vulnerable to serious logical and empirical objec-
tions that have not been convincingly rebutted? Because, Barendt 
suggests, the choice is already made; the favored principles are al-
ready implicit in the first amendment. Which brings us back 
around to the first question. And so on. The philosophical ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation gives a whole new meaning 
to the notion of a "hermeneutical circle." 
III 
This method of elevating and conferring legal status upon free 
speech principles inevitably leads to artificiality in the analysis of 
actual controversies. It is one thing to conclude, in the abstract, 
that speech deserves constitutional protection; but the application 
of the conclusion to concrete cases often places free speech princi-
ples in conflict with other public interests and needs. In such situa-
tions, courts in this country, and elsewhere, resort to balancing. 
6. This interpretive tactic obviously does not work as well where, as in Britain, there is 
no constitutional provision for the free speech principles to attach themselves to--hence 
Barendt's call for a British Bill of Rights to protect speech. 
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The critical question in this process is how much weight free speech 
principles should be given when they clash with other interests. 
One would like to be able to answer that the reasons for pro-
tecting speech should be given just as much weight as they in fact 
carry-that free speech principles should be respected only to the 
extent that they are actually persuasive. But the philosophical ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation cannot be comfortable with 
this answer. After all, the principles for protecting speech were not 
adopted purely on their merits in the :;rst place. If given only as 
much weight as they actually carry, tl ~y might not be entitled to 
constitutional status at all, much less to a "preferred position" that 
allows them to trump other interests, such as national security, or 
other constitutional rights, such as the right to a fair trial. 1 
Thus, the very method by which philosophical principles are 
imported into the law implies that when balancing occurs, the 
weight given such principles cannot be limited to that which their 
intrinsic persuasiveness would justify. Neither, however, can such 
principles be regarded as absolute; as Barendt remarks, in some sit-
uations, at least, it is "rather obvious ... that limits may be placed 
on speech to protect the public interest or a private right." Conse-
quently, whatever value is actually assigned to the speech interest in 
a balancing case will inevitably seem somewhat arbitrary. 
Indeed, while maintaining the appearance of rationality, free 
speech jurisprudence often seems more like a kind of hallowed eti-
quette in which, irrespective of their truth, some statements are im-
mune to challenge ("We had such an enjoyable evening") while 
other things ("You certainly have been putting on weight") are sim-
ply not said. In such an artificial world, acculturation replaces rea-
soned justification-even when conversation assumes the style of 
reasoning. Barendt's book faithfully reflects this world. His analy-
sis may seem perfectly plausible-even, at some points, obvious-to 
insiders who already know what the right answers are. But readers 
who are waiting to be persuaded will often find the analysis 
contrived. 
The unprincipled use of principle. One manifestation of artifici-
ality is the apparently arbitrary, ad hoc manner in which principles 
are invoked, or forgotten, in the justification of particular conclu-
sions. Early in the book, for instance, Barendt finds "perfectly rea-
sonable" the Supreme Court's decision upholding the conviction of 
David Paul O'Brien, who had expressed opposition to the Vietnam 
7. This observation finds support in Barendt's argument that in England, where the 
free speech principles cannot be disguised as constitutional interpretation and must therefore 
stand on their own merits, speech receives less protection. 
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War by burning his draft card. "It is immaterial that more conven-
tional forms of protest would be less effective," Barendt observes, 
"for there is no general right under a free speech principle to put 
over an opinion in the most newsworthy or dramatic way." 
Barendt may be right that free speech rationales do not cover effec-
tiveness of communication, although the point seems far from clear. 
But then how far does this limitation on speech protection extend? 
It seemingly might justify upholding convictions of persons who, 
like O'Brien, wanted to protest the war in colorful ways by, for in-
stance, burning the American flag, or by walking through a court-
house wearing a jacket which bore an obscene anti-draft slogan. 
Yet Barendt describes with apparent equanimity the Court's con-
trary decisions-without offering any explanation of why his analy-
sis of O'Brien would not apply in those cases. 
The seemingly arbitrary operation of Barendt's philosophical 
method is further evident in his treatment of obscenity. He begins 
by explaining that the rationales for protecting speech may not war-
rant treating obscenity as speech at all.s Thus, the pornography 
purveyor's "claim to be exercising freedom of expression is . . . 
transparently bogus." A few pages later, however, Barendt criti-
cizes measures designed to regulate but not prohibit obscenity-
through zoning schemes, for instance-by insisting that if indecent 
materials are protected at all, then they must receive just as much 
protection as any other kind of expression. These alternatives seem 
suspiciously stark. Is it likely that a class of materials, if judged by 
its real value, would deserve either full first amendment protection 
or, failing that, none at all? Barendt's ali-or-nothing position re-
flects the chasm that separates his philosophical maneuvers from 
real world interests and concerns. 
The diminution of practical concerns. Perhaps the most strik-
ing evidence of the artificiality of the philosophical free speech prin-
ciples appears when Barendt candidly acknowledges the cogency of 
pragmatic reasons for restricting particular forms of expression but 
nevertheless advocates adherence to principle. For instance, 
Barendt takes note of the argument that the restrictions on defama-
tion suits instituted in New York Times v. Sullivan actually damage 
democracy by deterring capable people from seeking public office, 
and by eroding public confidence in government. Barendt rejects 
8. The truth rationale appears to be inapplicable because obscene materials generally 
do not communicate ideas or appeal to the intellect, and obscenity seems far removed from 
the political speech which the democracy rationale would protect. Although the self-fulfill-
ment rationale might justify protection, the status of this rationale is dubious because it fails 
to explain why speech deserves more legal protection than other kinds of self-fulfilling 
behavior. 
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this argument, but not because its claims are factually false; 
although calling them "conjectural," he seems to believe that they 
may be true. Nor does Barendt attempt even a rough or impres-
sionistic empirical demonstration that the benefits to democracy of 
the Sullivan rule exceed its costs. Instead, he simply observes that 
"[t]he First Amendment is based on the assumption that everyone 
should be free to contribute to political debate." Because the first 
amendment is in some sense "based on" such a principle, the actual 
consequences of the Sullivan rule for democratic government can be 
brushed aside without even a factual assessment. 
In a similar vein, Barendt evaluates the recommendation of 
Britain's Williams Committee that film censorship be continued in 
that country. "Some of [the Committee's] practical points," he con-
cedes, "can hardly be denied: whatever its theoretical weaknesses, 
the system has worked satisfactorily in Britain, and most cinema 
distributors appreciated its advantages of certainty, speed of deci-
sion, and cheapness. Moreover, it is hard to quarrel with the expe-
rience of Committee members that some films are exceptionally 
nasty and sadistic." (Emphasis added). If the system has "worked 
satisfactorily," is appreciated by those directly subject to it, andre-
stricts films that are "exceptionally nasty and sadistic," then 
Barendt surely must approve of it, right? Wrong-he opposes the 
system, apparently because of its "theoretical weaknesses." But 
such analysis suggests that the theory in which such weaknesses are 
grounded must be far removed from practical realities. 
The pro-speech presumption. Barendt believes that close or 
doubtful questions ought to be resolved in favor of protecting 
speech and sacrificing other concerns. In presenting his general 
conclusions, he insists that "[t]he danger of suppression of speech 
which ought to be covered and protected by the free speech clause is 
a worse evil by far than the toleration on occasion of publications 
that could legitimately be proscribed." (Emphasis added). Though 
Barendt speaks here with the tone of one who is pronouncing a self-
evident truth, his assertion actually seems, upon reflection, almost 
reckless. In a world in which absolutes are scarce, is Barendt's gen-
eralization likely to be a member of that rare species? Isn't it more 
probable that the relative dangers of suppression versus nonsuppres-
sion vary with the context? 
For example, how can Barendt be so confident, in the face of 
the contrary judgment of jurists in France, Britain, and the other 
Commonwealth countries, that forcing readers to wait several 
weeks to learn of an alleged but inadmissible confession is a worse 
evil than the risk that a man charged with murder will be denied a 
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fair trial?9 In another controversy that Barendt discusses, the "dan-
ger of suppression of speech" refers to the possibility that residents 
of a New Jersey town might have to drive twenty miles to a neigh-
boring town in order to partake of the pleasure of watching nude 
dancing. Even if one agrees that imposing such a burden on the 
devotees of dance is unwarranted-or "surely illegitimate," as 
Barendt pronounces-is it clear that such a course would be "a 
worse evil by far" than the alternative? One suspects that aggres-
sive generalizations such as Barendt's reflect a lurking concern that 
if the reasons for protecting speech were candidly assessed for what 
they are worth, the author's preferred conclusions in such cases 
might be difficult to defend. 
Such a concern is well founded. The stylized argumentation 
that occurs in the artificial world of the first amendment may be 
comforting to those who have already absorbed that world's con-
ventions. It may be perfectly clear in that sheltered realm that a 
community has a negligible interest at best in preserving its moral 
character, but that to inconvenience people who enjoy nude dancing 
should be counted as a grave evil. When first amendment insiders 
attempt to address outsiders, however, there is a noticeable plausi-
bility gap. Barendt's book does little to close that gap. 
IV 
The general unpersuasiveness of Barendt's book might lead 
some readers to conclude that philosophy has little value for legal 
analysis. It is not foreordained, after all, that judges must imper-
sonate philosophers. Justice Black's effort to find an objective 
meaning in the text is an alternative that, in refined forms, seems to 
be experiencing a revival of interest.IO Advocates of a more textual 
approach might use Barendt's book to stand his "default" argument 
on its head: The first amendment must mean something; and since 
philosophical analysis plainly does not produce persuasive answers, 
we may have no choice except to look to the text. Or, if the objec-
tions to textual or framers' intent approaches seem insuperable, one 
might conclude that courts should simply get out of the business of 
protecting speech. II 
Such conclusions, however, are hardly irresistible. 12 The 
9. Barendt pronounces the British position "hard to reconcile with any serious com-
mitment to freedom of speech." 
10. See generally sources cited in Powell, Constitutional Law as Though the Constitu-
tion Mattered, 1986 DUKE L.J. 915, 927 n.53. 
11. See Nagel, How Useful is Judicial Review In Free Speech Cases?, 69 CORN. L. REV. 
302 (1984). 
12. At least I hope that the irrelevance of philosophy to the first amendment is not the 
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problems in Barendt's analysis originate not so much in his assump-
tion that philosophical reasoning may be valuable, as in his method 
of importing philosophy into constitutional interpretation. By as-
serting that philosophical principles tell us what the first amend-
ment means, Barendt not only transforms the amendment but also 
elevates particular philosophical principles to a status that they 
have not earned and may not merit. Such an approach reduces the 
incentive to evaluate philosophical arguments seriously and realisti-
cally. When scholars forego the temptation to pass off their philos-
ophy as interpretation of what the Constitution means, they will 
likely find themselves forced to do better philosophy. 
THE DOUGLAS LEITERS: SELECfiONS FROM THE 
PRIVATE PAPERS OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUG-
LAS. Edited with an introduction by Melvin L. Urofsky.1 
Bethesda, Md.: Adler & Adler. 1987. Pp. xxiii, 448. $24.95. 
Michael E. Parrish 2 
In a recent assessment of the Justice who served longer than 
any other on the Supreme Court of the United States, a distin-
guished legal historian described William Orville Douglas as "the 
anti-judge," a man whose fierce individualism and idiosyncratic 
style challenged two of the dominant assumptions of modern Amer-
ican jurisprudence: that appellate jurists should remain aloof from 
most forms of political engagement and that their opinions ought to 
display a decent regard for precedent and the trappings of legal 
scholarship.J Bill Douglas seldom paid obeisance to the judicial, 
political, or social conventions of the time, because in his concep-
tion of human nature they remained the principal enemies of the 
authentic self. He looked upon life as a series of obstacles to be 
overcome and battles to be won by the heroic self against the op-
pressive institutional arrangements of society. A loner and a narcis-
proper moral to draw, since I have made a meager attempt of my own to develop a "philo-
sophical" rationale for protecting speech. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the 
Theory of Free Expression, 60S. CAL. L. REv. 649 (1987). 
1. Professor of History, Virginia Commonwealth University. 
2. Professor of History, University of California, San Diego. 
3. White, The Anti-Judge: William 0. Douglas and the Ambiguities of Individuality, 
74 VA. L. REV. 17 (1988). 
